



in a Di®erential Game I
??????? ?
We o®er a series of detailed accounts of the Stackelberg equilibrium
solutions in di®erential games. The present paper focuses on the
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium that has been extensively employed
in the application literature, e.g., optimal capital taxation. After
formally computing the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for a simple
leader-follower model in which the welfare-maximizing government leads
and the monopolistic ¯rm follows, we discuss the time inconsistency
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a¡ p ????????????? a > 0 ???????????????p
??????2)??????????????????????? x ????
???? cx + x2=2 ?????????????????????????
??????????????? 1???????? s ?????????
??????????????? ¼ ????????????






W ´ (a¡ p)
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?????????????????????? a ¡ p ¡ x ???????
?????????????????????3)?













s.t. _p = k(a¡ p¡ x):
2) ???? p ? p(t) ????????????????????????????? t ???
???????
3) ????????????????? Simaan and Takayama (1978) ?????Fershtman
and Kamien (1987)?Tsutsui and Mino (1990)?Fujiwara (2006, 2009) ??????
??????
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??? r > 0 ?????????????????????????
















HM = (p¡ c+ s)x¡ x
2
2
+ ¸k(a¡ x¡ p);
??????? HM ??????????????¸ ??????????
??????????????? 1????????????
0 = p¡ c+ s¡ x¡ ¸k (3)
_¸ = (r + k)¸¡ x (4)




(3) ? (4), (5) ????? x ???????? 2?????????????
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??????????????????????? I
_¸ = (r + 2k)¸¡ p¡ s+ c (6)
_p= k(k¸¡ 2p¡ s+ a+ c): (7)
??????????????????????????????????























s.t. (6) and (7):






(p¡ c¡ s+ k¸)(p¡ c+ s¡ k¸)
2
+¹[(r + 2k)¸¡ p¡ s+ c] + ºk(k¸¡ 2p¡ s+ a+ c):
????????? 1??????????????
0 =¡s+ k¸¡ ¹¡ kº (8)
_¹=¡k¹ (9)
_º = ¹+ (r + 2k)º ¡ 2p+ a+ c (10)
_¸ = ¹+ kº + (r + k)¸¡ p+ c (11)






0 = ¹(0): (13)
????? (9)-(12) ? (8) ???? s ?????????????????
??(9)-(12) ? 2???????? ¹; º ? 2?????? ¸; p ??????
????????????????????????
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¡k 0 0 0
1 r + 2k 0 ¡2
1 k r + k ¡1

















¡k ¡ y 0 0 0
1 r + 2k ¡ y 0 ¡2
1 k r + k ¡ y ¡1
k k2 0 ¡2k ¡ y

= (¡k ¡ y)(r + k ¡ y) y2 ¡ ry ¡ 2k(r + k) = 0;
????? 4?????????????????????????














?????????????? ¹; º; ¸; p ????????????????
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??? Ai; Bi; Ci; Di; i = 1; 2; 3; 4 ???????????????????
?????????
???????????????? Ai; Bi; Ci; Di ???????????
???????????????????????????????? ¹(t)
????? (15) ??????????????(9) ?????????
¹(t) = ¹(0)e¡kt;
????????????????? (13) ?????? ¹(t) = 0 ?????
????????????????????????????????
???? ¡k ??????????????????????
A1 :??; A2 =
A1
r + k




????????? A1 = ¹(0) = 0 ????????????????? A2
? A4 ???????
?? t ? 1 ????????????????????????????



























?? t ??????? B2; B3; B4 ???????????????????
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?????????????????? ¹(t) ? t ?????????? p(t)
????????? ¸ ????????????????? t ???? 1 ?

















????? ¹(0) = 0 ?? ¸(0) ????????????????????






?????? ¹(t) = 0 ???? t ???????????????????
?????? ¹ ??????? (9) ??????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
????? ¹(t) = 0 ?????????????????????????
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